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1. Introduction  
 
In Spring 2015, the Oberlin College Politics department organized a symposium 
on National Security and the dangers of Big Data. In an interview with student press, 
only political science professor Robert Jervis concluded that the biggest threat to national 
security was still nuclear weapons. All other panel members almost instantly cited 
“cyber” as the greatest threat to American security. While nuclear weapons and cyber 
warfare can certainly be combined, most cyber attacks—if they are even considered 
attacks in the first place—do not cause immediate physical damage or endanger civilians. 
As the Stuxnet incident shows, malignant cyber operations pose unique challenges to 
current international law.  
There is a spectrum of what actions conducted in cyberspace can do, and of 
reasons it may affect US national security. The revelations from Wikileaks in 2011 and 
Edward Snowden in 2013 show that information can be disseminated literally with the 
click of a button. This may endanger people’s lives on important political missions.  
Drones are also launched and controlled remotely over networks—but it is possible for 
these controls to be usurped by someone with malignant intentions. “Cyber” as a 
potential means for conflict has been examined by legislators: for example, President 
Obama established a Cybersecurity Initiative in 2009, which outlined steps and listed 
priorities in protecting American information and communications. Cyber conflict poses 
unique threats, because states are not the only actors; individuals and organizations may 
access classified information and leak it to the public, or cause physical destruction to 





cyberspace may endanger civilians. The capacity of cyber operations must be more 
closely examined in international law so that states have clearer protocol to evaluate and 
regulate what happens in this seemingly anarchic sphere. 
This paper examines the following question: How does international law of 
aggression and self-defense fall short in addressing cyber warfare? I consider the Stuxnet 
incident from 2006-2010 as a case study, and evaluate whether Iran could retaliate 
against the US for attacking its nuclear facility. The Stuxnet incident has not been 
directly discussed in other considerations of Article 51, self-defense, and aggression. 
Authors like Eriksson and Giacomello have examined how traditional International 
Relations theories and cyber operations may intersect, but have failed to add case studies 
to the literature. Barring the Tallinn Manual, edited by Michael Schmitt, cyber operations 
have rarely been considered under international law. Existing literature overstates the 
potential for cyber conflict, and does not offer specific examples to consider cyber 
conflict in legal terms; the articles written tend to focus on arms control for policymakers. 
This paper is a case study in the Stuxnet incident, but the legal implications could also be 
relevant for other cyber operations of this scale.  
   I argue that the technical capabilities of the Stuxnet worms show that it could be 
considered an act of aggression under the Rome Statute and that Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is insufficient to address malignant cyber operations.  
This paper pertains to jus ad bellum, or the right to wage a war, over jus in bello, 
or proper conduct during a war, as I consider whether Iran could retaliate. Determining 
whether the launch of Stuxnet was aggression or self-defense is central to my argument; I 





true that due to the time constraints of cyber operations, it may be the case that jus in 
bello may also be relevant; it is entirely possible for future cyber attacks to harm 
civilians, which would not be just conduct under Fourth Geneva Convention. However, 
the international legal documents I examine do not provide specific time frames beyond 
general phrases like “imminent attack,” which makes it more difficult to ascertain the 
exact point when a cyber attack begins and ends. As this paper shows, Stuxnet inflicted 
gradual, episodic damage, which has a different impact than if, for example, the US were 
to bomb on Iran’s nuclear facility once. Cyber operations work differently than attacks 
via conventional weapons. This paper demonstrates that traditional definitions and laws 
do not fit comfortably when considering cyber warfare. 
The Stuxnet incident, launched by the US and likely Israel, took place over the 
four-year period of 2006-2010. When I discuss how Iran could have responded, I refer to 
the time period after the attack was realized in 2010. It is unlikely that Iran could claim 
self-defense and retaliate against the US and Israel today, six years after the attack was 
realized. 
I used a historical approach to my methodology. I examined legal precedent 
concerning self-defense and aggression in cases like US v. Nicaragua and incidents like 
the US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 to show how self-defense and aggression have been 
applied. I also examined legal documents like the UN Charter, particularly as Article 51 
is central to this paper. I looked at technical reports and news articles dissecting the 
Stuxnet incident. I also read books and journal articles about both international relations 





how international relations theory and international law may be combined when 
considering cyber conflicts.  
I first discuss the applicability of International Relations (IR) theory, and how 
political scientists determine the applicability of international law. Next, I introduce 
technological vocabulary that is key to my paper’s argument. These terms include 
“cyber,” “operation,” and “attack.” I then outline the events of the Stuxnet incident. I 
analyze the incident given the historical and legal connotations of “aggression,” and 
reiterate that the Stuxnet incident could not be accurately portrayed as “anticipatory self-
defense.” Finally, I consider how my analysis would differ had there been attribution 
problem—or, if Stuxnet had launched by an unknown actor. I conclude that Article 51 is 
insufficient to address responses to aggressive cyber operations between states.   
In Lights Out, Koppel notes that, “where FEMA’s presumed 9.0 earthquake 
would leave a city in rubble, with thousands of dead and injured, even the most massive 
cyberattack would inflict very little immediate physical damage.” 1 However, he adds that 
a cyberattack on the continental US powergrid could trigger an intense “domino-like, 
cascade effect,” causing electrical blackout where civilians have limited access to 
resources they are used to like plumbing, information, heat or air-conditioning, and so 
forth. 2 This paper examines how a single cyber operation—Stuxnet—highlights the 
unique need to re-evaluate our international legal norms, customary and codified, to deal 
with unconventional weapons of potential mass destruction.  
  
                                                
1 Ted Koppel. Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the  
Aftermath (Crown, 2015), 15. 





2. Research Limitations 
 
 I do not discuss the role of corporate non-state actors in this paper. It is certainly 
worth noting that transnational corporations often have stakes in cyber security matters, 
but understanding their role goes beyond the scope of discussing Stuxnet as the primary 
case study in cyber operations; the types of operations that most affect corporate non-
states actors most often concern their organization’s privacy and citizens’ personal data. 
The “Right to be Forgotten” on Google and other search engines, as is being discussed in 
the European Union at parliamentary and judicial levels, is crucial to understanding the 
continued jurisdictional issues that come with managing Internet activity. However, 
because it does not relate to kinetic implications for weapons of mass destruction, it is 
outside of the scope of this thesis.  
 I also do not address industrial sabotage laws in this paper. Sabotage is the 
deliberate destruction of another state’s resource to gain a political or military advantage, 
which is an obvious example of intervening in another state’s affairs. Sabotage takes 
place when one state’s national security interests are directly at stake. Future cyber 
attacks and operations may more closely resemble sabotage than conventional weapons. 
However, further investigation about specific sabotage instances was beyond the scope of 
this paper. This paper dissects Stuxnet specifically, and laws about aggression and self-
defense, both of which I felt needed to be re-evaluated most in the context of future 
malignant cyber operations. Stuxnet was certainly intended to sabotage the production of 
centrifuges at Natanz, but discussing sabotage in international law more generally was 





I did not cover the jus in bello implications of cyber attacks as much as I had 
originally intended to. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, civilians are to be protected 
during wartime. However, definitions like “civilian” and “wartime” would both need to 
be reevaluated in the context of cyber operations; these would both rely on the scale of 
the attack in question, which could not be examined without details of a specific attack. 
While there is certainly tension between the US and Iran, these states are not officially at 
war with one another. Further, the Stuxnet incident did not directly endanger civilians. 
Thus, the jus in bello implications are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 This highlights a similar question raised in the paper: could a malignant cyber 
operation be considered an attack in international law if no civilians are directly harmed? 







3. Context: International Relations Theory And Types of International Law 
 
 In this section, I discuss why international law is a useful and appropriate 
framework to consider the Stuxnet incident. 
 
3. a. Context for the International Legal System: 
Most states, especially smaller ones, rely on international law to help level 
inequalities of power as they engage with other states. Pragmatically, cyber operations 
confront an existing international legal system with jurisdictional problems. The Internet 
notoriously has no borders, and yet we must engage with other states to determine where 
certain cyber activity comes from. For example: If someone in Croatia stole another 
person’s identity and used a search engine whose server is located in Norway, if that 
Croatian’s activity were to be traced, it would look as though the activity had been 
initiated in Norway. In this scenario, under both the passive personality and active 
personality principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, Norway and Croatia would both 
have jurisdiction in prosecuting that crime.3 After all, “a State may exercise control over 
cyber infrastructure and activities within its sovereign territory.”4 Cyberspace operates 
beyond state borders, but the international community functions in the context of state 
actors. 
International law is based on the repeated behaviors of powerful states. In the 
nineteenth century, it was used as a doctrine “to justify acquisition of territory by colonial 
                                                
3 Michael N. Schmitt. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber  
Warfare: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence. (New York, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013): 20. 





powers.”5 Today, it is derived from codified treaties between states, or by signing 
massive group treaties, like to the membership of the United Nations (UN). Customary 
law, or an unwritten set of rules that states almost always follow, is another form of 
international law. Customary law: 
“evolves from state practice. It does not require the formal negotiation and express 
consent associated with treaties. A rule of customary international law binds all states that 
have not objected to the rule while it is in the process of formation.”6 
 
Not all international law is binding per se. Soft law is another branch of 
international law. This ranges from “foreign investment to telecommunications to human 
rights,” and is also considered under the umbrella of international law, though these laws 
are legally nonbinding.”7 Law may also originate from specific unilateral declarations by 
state leaders: for example, “the United States will not commit genocide.”   
When conflict between states arises, it can be adjudicated at the international 
level. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the judicial branch of the United Nations, 
and the ICJ can weigh in on these conflicts. This was originally set up as the International 
Court of Arbitration under the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and later in the 
League of Nations. The UN may also establish additional tribunals to investigate specific 
conflicts. The first international tribunal to be held since the Nuremberg Trials after 
World War II was the International Court Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Judicial decisions from the ICJ or other tribunals are another form of international law. 
However, these precedents are not necessarily cumulative. 
                                                
5 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven D. Ratner, and David Wippman. International Law: Norms,  
Actors, Process: A Problem-Oriented Approach (New York, NY: Aspen, 2010): 11.  
6 Dunoff, ibid, 36. 





 I mention the types of international law because it is helpful context for 
understanding our international institutions. However, I draw my analysis from legal 
cases and codified law like the UN Charter and Rome Statute, as these are most pertinent 
to the subject of my paper.  
 
3. b. The Use of International Relations Theory in International Law:  
  
 There are several different theories of International Relations (IR) that are worth 
mentioning in this paper. They hypothesize the motives of state behavior, and by 
extension, whether the actions of states can be constrained by international law. 
Realists assert that states are self-interested actors who act to maximize their 
power and preserve their existence. They resolve that the international system is anarchic. 
Further, they define power as material, military capability, and believe that states can 
measure power in relative terms—in other words, how much more power they have than 
another state: “States that maximize relative power are concerned primarily with the 
distribution of material capabilities.”8 Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau argue the 
self-interested nature of actors stems from human nature. Conversely, defensive (or 
structural) realists like Kenneth Waltz respectively believe that anarchy drives this “self-
survival” instinct.9 They argue that anarchy itself is an ordering principle: “Structure is 
not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them.”10 On the 
other hand, offensive realists like John Meirsheimer purport that, “the structure of the 
                                                
8 John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001): 36. 
9 Mearsheimer, ibid, 15. 
10 Kenneth N. Waltz. Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley  





international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers, causes 
them to think and act offensively and seek hegemony.”11 States gain power relative to 
one another; states play a zero-sum game by engaging in international relations, and 
relative gains from state A diminish the gains from state B. Thus, the balance of power in 
the international system is an important consideration.  
Classical and offensive realists would argue that international law does not matter 
because states are self-interested and have little concern for other states that do not 
threaten by them. By extension, they believe that a peaceful world is unrealistic. 
Defensive realists would say that it matters to the extent that institutions like the UN were 
set up with the intention of mitigating this anarchy. In keeping with this logic, Waltz 
would say that states wield to international law only when it is in their interest to do so.  
 Liberalism is another branch of IR theory, and recognizes the potential merits of 
international law. Liberalists agree with Waltz, but they believed that structural realism is 
a choice. In other words, they argue that such attention to the structure of anarchy is 
malleable, because people’s perceptions are malleable. Like their realist counterparts, 
liberalists agree that states are the primary actors in the international system, but add that 
a state’s own internal factors influence its behavior in the international arena. Within the 
scope of liberalism, there are several additional theories: one is Democratic Peace Theory 
(DPT), which purports that democracies do not go to war with one another.12 Other 
liberalists argue that economic interdependence among states makes them unlikely to 
fight one another. Institutionalists assert that once states start pursuing their own interests 
                                                
11 Meirsheimer, ibid, 53. 





with treaties, this pattern of behavior gains momentum. Constructivists add that 
determining what constitutes appropriate behavior in the international arena may be 
constructed out of self-interest, but that morals, social interactions, and other non-state 
actors play crucial roles in international relations as well. These various branches of 
liberalism see international law as important. While states may exist in anarchy, that 
anarchy is actively being weakened by international law; the fact that the US needs to its 
actions like the 2003 Invasion of Iraq using international law is hard to explain through a 
purely material perspective. 
 International political theorists and law experts are often at odds with one another 
because of those differing underlying assumptions about the roots of state power and in 
how state interactions are organized. Law is a way that institutions attempt to mitigate 
anarchy in the international system. Realists believe law is irrelevant, because there is no 
material way to enforce those laws. While the underlying assumptions about states being 
self-interested actors may be true, international law does appear to constrain the actions 








4. Understanding “Cyber” Within The Scope Of This Paper 
 
The jargon scholars use to define “cyber,” and what can be done with it, evokes a 
different image than the vocabulary used for other weapons of mass destruction.13 This is 
partly due to many academics’ inadequate understanding of what can actually happen in 
cyberspace. A largely hyperbolic literature suggests that most scholars and policymakers 
are unsure of causes and effects of cyber destruction. Eriksson and Giacomello note that 
the traditional notions of state sovereignty in typical international law break down in the 
context of cyber, because it operates beyond state borders.14 They add that the state is less 
powerful now than in traditional international law, because the Internet allows people to 
disseminate information especially quickly without the influence of the state or 
traditional journalistic institutions; this gives more power to the individual and to non-
state organizations.15 
In this section, I define “cyber,” and I discuss its role in outlining different types 
of cyber operations. As part 3.b. of this section shows, none of the known or most 
frequent types of operations parallel what happened in the Stuxnet attack. 
 
4. a. Defining “Cyber” 
 Valeriano and Maness defined the term “cyber” as “computer or digital 
interactions” between devices.16 By extension, “cyberspace” refers to  
                                                
13 It is worth noting that weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks can certainly be combined. 
14 Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello. “The Information Revolution, Security,  
and International Relations: (IR) Relevant Theory?” (International Political Science Review 3, 
2006): 224. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445053. Accessed July 30, 2015. 
15 Eriksson and Giacomello, ibid, 224. 





“all of the computer networks in the world and everything they connect and control. It’s 
not just the Internet . . . cyberspace includes the Internet plus lots of other networks of 
computers that are not supposed to be accessible from the Internet.”17  
 
Importantly, cyberspace does not exist outside the network of machines. Human error is 
more likely to take place in “air gaps.” “Air-gapped” technology means there is no 
physical connection between two devices—say, a secure server at the White House and 
someone’s personal computer.18 In theory, this would keep the information stored on a 
secure server completely separate and impossible to access from elsewhere on the 
network. However, machines often thought disconnected from cyberspace may not 
always be disconnected in practice due to human error. When devices are linked on the 
same network, it makes them each more vulnerable to attack than if they had been 
successfully air-gapped. 
“Whenever Homeland Security or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has hired 
computer forensic experts to investigate this claim, however, they have found minute 
connections. A Verizon/Secret Service study concluded that two-thirds of companies 
across a spectrum of industries didn’t realize that they had been breached until someone 
outside the company informed them. Another study, conducted by the cyber-security firm 
FireEye, found that it took on average 279 days before companies that had been breached 
came to realize it or were told by someone else” 19 
 
In addition to a lack of resources, air-gapping often fails to account for human error: 
“Every time a worker brings in a thumb drive or laptop from home and hooks it up to an 
‘isolated’ system, the mobility of workers bridges the air gap.” 20 While not directly 
relevant to my paper, I mention air-gapping because it is a microcosm of how easy it is 
for hackers to access networks they were not meant to.  
                                                                                                                                            
Conflict in the International System.” (Oxford University Press Scholarship Online, 2015): 2. 
Accessed August 30, 2015. 
17 Clarke and Knake (2010: 70) cited in Valeriano, ibid. 
18 Koppel, ibid, 42. 
19 Koppel, ibid, 43. 





Cyberspace exists outside of state borders, yet how the international community 
responds to cyber conflicts exists purely within the realm of state actors. 
Communications for crimes conducted in cyberspace may take place over a “virtual 
private network, or VPN, for secure communications,” and it is often unclear where cyber 
operations originate from. In many cases, this renders the typical jurisdictional notions 
associated with state sovereignty vague and often irrelevant. 21 
 
 
4. b. Conflict Vocabulary And Frequent Types Of Operations  
 
When weapons can operate in cyberspace, beyond the jurisdiction of states and 
without the typical consequences of other conventional forms of attack (for instance, one 
state bombing another), we must reconsider the vocabulary we use to describe the 
possibilities for different kinds of conflict. 
 Scholars often use terms like “conflict” to refer to altercations between states in 
cyberspace. This works well because it is a general term, and does not necessarily imply 
kinetic damage like the word “attack” would. Most conflicts in cyberspace do not 
endanger people’s lives in the way that, say, a bomb would. Thus, it does not imply that 
direct, physical warfare as we know it would result from an altercation.22 The term 
“conflict” can also be synonymous with “operation,” because both are less grave than a 
cyber attack with a direct physical result that endangers civilians. 
                                                
21 Joel Brenner. Glass Houses: Privacy, Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity in a Transparent  
World (Penguin, 2013): 28.  





    It is important to note these differences because most cyber altercations that 
occur—barring Stuxnet—have not resulted in physical damage. For context, most cyber 
operations that take place are what experts call “Distributed Denial of Service,” or 
DDOS, operations. These involve:  
“Flooding sites, servers, or routers with more requests for data than the site can respond 
to or process (This method shuts down the site, thereby preventing access or usage.”23  
 
An often-cited example of a DDOS attack is the Bronze Soldier Dispute between Estonia 
and Russian hackers in 2007. This took place during a political dispute between Estonia 
and Russia over the relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, a Soviet statue that 
commemorated war graves.24 Targets in this attack included the websites of: 
“the Estonian presidency and its parliament; almost all of the country's government 
ministries; political parties; three of the country's six big news organizations; two of the 
biggest banks; and firms specializing in communications.”25   
 
DDOS operations are among the most common types of cyber operations, but not all 
cyber operations are so benign. 
 A more grave kind of cyber operation is an “intrusion.” This includes: 
“Trapdoors or Trojans are unauthorized software added to a program to allow entry into a 
victim’s network or software program. They permit future access to a site once it has 
been initially intruded upon. Intrusions need to be added to software, can remain dormant 
for a long time, and then propagate themselves without notice...They only become 
malicious once they become operational.” 26 
Intrusions “must be installed by a user and are implemented at the whim of a hacker’s 
command (Northcutt 2007). An operator can install the malicious program at one point in 
                                                
23 Valeriano, ibid, 10. 
24 Ian Traynor. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.” The  
Guardian, May 16, 2007. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia  
25 Traynor, ibid. 





time and then activate it at a later date.” 27 The purpose of these intrusions is primarily to 
“steal sensitive information from secured sites,” including personal information of 
civilians. 28 The US Department of Defense has declared the use of infiltrations are an act 
of war. 29 Viruses and worms that affect many computers are both forms of intrusions. 
Viruses are: “programs that need help by a hacker to propagate and can be attached to 
existing programs in a network or act as stand-alone programs (they generally replicate 
themselves with the intention of corrupting or modifying files).” Worms do this as well, 
but can also self-propagate.” 30  
 Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are another kind of infiltration method.  
The intentions of APTs are: 
“usually are more malicious and advanced and almost certainly come from states, and 
their targets are much more specific. The level of sophistication is unmatched, meaning 
highly covert and intentional state action is behind the malicious intent, making APTs the 
most likely to evoke strong, negative, and escalatory reactions from the target state if and 
when discovered.” 31 
The Tallinn Manual notes that cyber operations often pose danger. They note that 
some of the most common cyber crimes are: 
“Cyber espionage, theft of intellectual property, and a wide range of criminal activities in 
cyberspace pose real and serious threats to all States, as well as to corporations and 
private individuals.” 32 
 
However, the authors note that the legal outcomes vary if peoples’ lives are not directly 
endangered. The Tallinn Manual also provides a framework for approaching what 
                                                
27 Valeriano, ibid, 10. 
28 Valeriano, ibid, 10. 
29 Valeriano, ibid, 10. 
30 Valeriano, ibid, 11. 
31 Valeriano, ibid, 10. 





constitutes a “use of force” and “armed attack” in the scope of cyber operations, both of 
which are discussed later in this paper.  
Stone argues that “the violent effects of cyber war need not be lethal to fall under 
the conception of war”—but in this matter, cyber operations that attempt to steal 
information might be equated with espionage in most circumstances.33 In this way, cyber 
operations might be equated with another kind of tool to be used by state actors, 
particularly when these are done as defensive measures. However, espionage is not 
addressed in this paper because Stuxnet was not a case of usurping information; it was a 
direct attack intended to sabotage the continued production of centrifuges.  
Evaluating different kinds of cyber operations, one must consider—at what point 
can these be considered an act of war? More specifically, could any of these attacks be 
considered a violation of the UN Charter Chapter II? When physical infrastructure is 
affected beyond a DDOS attack, the effect would be kinetic and invasive, which may and 
more closely parallel international law on conventional weapons. 
 In this section, I discussed what the term “cyber” means, and defined different 
types of cyber operations. Next, I discuss the technical parameters and legal implications 
of the Stuxnet worms and overall incident.  
  
   
 
  
                                                





5. The Stuxnet Operation 
 
 
 This section provides an overview of the Stuxnet operation. First, I describe the 
objectives of the two separate worms launched on Iran’s facility in Natanz. In doing so, I 
outline how this attack proceeded and was undiscovered for four years. I then open my 
analysis towards the Charter and other legal documents as I examine how this attack 
would be considered under international law.   
 
5. a. What Happened At Natanz: A Technical Explanation Of The Stuxnet Incident: 
 
Stuxnet started with two worms: though the first was more discrete than the 
second on a technical level, they shared the same objective—to damage centrifuges at 
Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. Based on the motive of the attack—to alter and damage the 
enrichment of uranium at Iran’s nuclear facility—it could be considered a complex 
intrusion, or even an APT.  
The centrifuges at this facility were being enriched, which is arguably a core step 
to create a nuclear weapon.34 By effectively “sabotage[ing] the country’s uranium 
enrichment program, [it] prevent[ed] President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from building a 
nuclear weapon.”35 
The Stuxnet worms were successful in part due to the unique conditions at 
                                                
34 Ralph Langner. “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s  
Creators Tried to Achieve.” The Langner Group, 2013. 
35 Zetter, Kim. “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing  






Natanz. The plant is located 156 miles south of Tehran, and its perimeter is protected 
with military-level security. The facility is large, as were the trays of centrifuges it 
produced: 
“The aluminum centrifuges, which are housed in bunkers, are 1.8 meters (5 foot 10 
inches) tall and 10 centimeters (four inches) in diameter. Their purpose is to gradually 
increase the proportion of uranium-235, the fissile isotope of uranium. There is a rotor 
inside the centrifuges that rotates at a speed of 1,000 times per second. In the process, 
uranium hexafluoride gas is centrifuged, so that uranium-235 accumulates in the center. 
The process is controlled by a Siemens system that runs on the Microsoft Windows 
operating system.”36  
 
Ralph Langner, a data scientist whose research group analyzed the technical 
specifications of Stuxnet, gives a brief history of the Natanz nuclear facility in his report 
of the incident: 
“The backbone of Iran’s uranium enrichment effort is the IR-1 centrifuge which goes 
back to a European design of the late Sixties / early Seventies that was stolen by Pakistani 
nuclear trafficker A. Q. Khan. It is an obsolete design that Iran never managed to operate 
reliably. Reliability problems may well have started as early as 1987, when Iran began 
experimenting with a set of decommissioned P-1 centrifuges acquired from the Khan 
network. Problems with getting the centrifuge rotors to spin flawlessly will also likely 
have resulted in the poor efficiency that can be observed when analyzing IAEA reports, 
suggesting that the IR-1 performs only half as well – best case – as it could theoretically. 
A likely reason for such poor performance is that Iran reduced the operating pressure of 
the centrifuges in order to lower rotor wall pressure. But less pressure means less 
throughput – and thus less efficiency.”37  
The facility was using poorly-designed, antiquated machinery, which made it more 
vulnerable to attack.   
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 Around the time when Stuxnet first began infecting computers in Iran—which 
analysts speculate was around 2006—Iran was using a Cascade Protection System in its 
uranium enrichment system. Centrifuges are made of extremely sensitive material, and 
even touching one can cause severe damage. The centrifuges at Natanz have shut-off 
valves for every stage of centrifuge and enrichment piping to ensure they run securely; 
the chemical balance of a centrifuge is crucial, and even oil from touching one can cause 
the system to malfunction. Individual centrifuges are shut off by the facility’s valve 
isolation process (discussed later) if they are functioning incorrectly. When multiple 
centrifuges in same stage of the enrichment plant get isolated, maintenance might not 
have the chance to repair one or move another. If this happens too frequently, UF6 gas 
pressure increases—this is “the most sensitive parameter in uranium enrichment using 
centrifuges.”38 
The objective of Stuxnet (the worm) was to pressurize the entire system. If part of 
the centrifuge system is disrupted, pressure must be adjusted elsewhere or the remaining 
centrifuges will be over-pressurized. One of the worms sought to block the valve 
isolation process. 39 
“When the actual malicious process manipulations begin, all isolation valves for the first 
two and the last two enrichment stages are closed, thereby blocking the product and tails 
outflow of process gas to each affected cascade. From the remaining centrifuges, more 
centrifuges are isolated, except in the feed stage. The consequence is that operating 
pressure in the non-isolated centrifuges increases as UF6 continues to flow into the 
centrifuge via the feed, but cannot escape via the product and tails take-offs, causing 
pressure to rise continuously.” 40 
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The first Stuxnet worm increased pressure as the second sped up the rotation of the 
centrifuges. 41 These two worms each had a specific target, and were completely 
autonomous, enabling them to remain undiscovered for four years. 42 At the facility, the 
status of each centrifuge is reflected on a central facility; green dots represent the 
normally-functioning centrifuges, while grey dots indicate that a centrifuge has been shut 
off. With the presence two worms, many centrifuges were shut off—and while the central 
computer should have indicated that with a grey dot, with the presence of the worm, they 
showed up as green.  
The damage incurred was episodic, but was not catastrophic all at once. Many of 
the plant’s centrifuges were unaffected by Stuxnet. As Ralph Langner noted in his TED 
Talk: 
“What we also saw is that the goal of the attack was to do it slowly and creepy—
obviously in an effort to drive maintenance engineers crazy, that they would not be able 
to figure this out quickly.”43 
 
The computers at Nantanz were air-gapped, yet the Stuxnet worms went around 
these air-gapped devices. They were likely introduced to the facility by a USB flash 
drive, which remained dormant in the drive until activated by the scientists who built the 
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5. b. Attributing Stuxnet 
The Stuxnet worm was first discovered by Sergey Ulasen in Belarus. Ulasen  
Worked at the research firm Virus Blok Ada in Minsk, “in the research and development 
department at the VirusBlokAda security firm in Minsk, [after having] received what 
seemed to be a relatively mundane email on June 17, 2010.”44 He traced back the worm 
to servers located in Malaysia and Denmark, where they had been registered under false 
domain names and forged credit cards.45 At the time of its discovery, Stuxnet worm had 
infected “about 100,000 computers worldwide, including more than 60,000 in Iran, more 
than 10,000 in Indonesia, and more than 5,000 in India” before it was discovered.46 47 
While the worms were likely meant to affect Natanz specifically, the code that launched 
the worms damaged other computer systems with the same technical, assembly-line 
capacities. This detail is important because there was an overall generic code, but its 
variables clearly indicated that it was targeting the Natanz facility: 
“The big digital warhead—we had a shot at this by looking very closely at data and data 
structures. So for example, the number 164 really stands out in that code; you can’t 
overlook it. I started to research scientific literature on how these centrifuges are actually 
built in Natanz and found that they are structured in what is called a cascade, and each 
cascade holds 164 centrifuges. So that made sense, that was a match....These centrifuges 
in Iran are subdivided into 15... stages. And guess what we found in the attack code? An 
almost identical structure. [of almost 15,000 individual lines of code]. So again, that was 
a real good match. And this gave us very high confidence for what we were looking at.”48 
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Langner said in his TED Talk that there were almost 15,000 individual lines of 
code, which looked like “old assembly line language.”49 However, even though certain 
variables (such as the numbers themselves that were used to identify a match with the 
Natanz facility) were clearly programmed to infect computers at Nantanz, the code itself 
is generic, which presents certain other dangers: 
“It doesn’t have anything to do, in specifics, with centrifuges, with uranium enrichment. 
So it would work as well, for example, in a power plant or in an automobile factory. It is 
generic. And you don’t have—as an attacker—you don’t have to deliver this payload by a 
USB stick, as we saw it in the case of [the] Stuxnet [operation]. You could also use 
conventional worm technology for spreading. Just spread it as wide as possible. And if 
you do that, what you end up with is a cyber weapon of mass destruction.”50  
 
Unlike a nuclear weapon with an immediate physical impact, Stuxnet inflicted episodic, 
gradual damage. As many scientists have already noted, the technical capabilities 
exhibited in Stuxnet indicate that it is entirely possible for a similar attack to also go 
unnoticed for a significant amount of time.  
Stuxnet itself was sophisticated and discrete, but the operation’s implications are 
far greater than its technical prowess: “The virus represents a fundamentally new addition 
to the arsenal of modern warfare. It enables a military attack using a computer program 
tailored to a specific target,” over an extended period of time. This poses many critical 
questions about the future of warfare. More specifically, it raises the question of what 
constitutes an armed attack in a cyberwar context.51 The data structures in the code show 
that this was likely targeted to this facility, but the code is generic and affected other 
computers with the same technical parameters as well. 
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In this section, I described how these two worms sabotaged the production of 
centrifuges at Iran’s nuclear facility at Natanz. In the next section, I discuss the historical 
and legal implications for “aggression” and “self-defense” before I examine how these 








6. Historical and Legal Roots Of “Aggression” And “Self-Defense”  
 Both aggression and self-defense concern jus ad bellum. Under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, responding to an armed attack in self-defense is legal. Aggression, on the 
other hand, is when one state initiates an armed attack without the pretense of self-
defense. These definitions are challenged by cyber warfare in that it can be difficult to 
ascertain exactly when an attack begins and ends. This also becomes complicated when 
considering offensive attacks that have not yet taken place. If there is little evidence of an 
imminent attack, it would likely constitute a preventive attack, which is within the scope 
of an act of aggression. However, if there is evidence and overwhelming certainty that an 
imminent attack will soon take place, a state can retaliate in anticipatory self-defense, 
otherwise known as a pre-emptive strike. 
In this section, I consider the historical roots of aggression. I list the 
institutionalized definitions of aggression between World Wars I and II, and discuss how 
aggression has been codified and adjudicated. 
 
6. a. Historical Roots of Aggression and Self-Defense: 
 
“Aggression” emerged as an illegal act relatively recently. Historically, one could 
begin by looking at the Babylonian invasion of Judah and the subsequent destruction of 
the first Temple in 587 BCE. Powerful empires like that of the Romans were constantly 
at war as they acquired new territory.52 Such conquests for land took a different turn after 
the Peace of Westphalia, announced in 1648. International relations theorists consider 
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this international agreement, negotiated as the end of the Thirty Years War and the 
Eighty Years War, which was negotiated by Europe’s most powerful nation-states at the 
time.53 This is seen by international relations experts as the root for the concept of state 
sovereignty—or, that states can have specific borders, not to be interrupted by another 
state or empire. This principle became a centerpiece of the United Nations.   
 As stated before, self-defense does not always need to be in response to an armed 
attack. In some circumstances, states can attack other states when there is evidence of an 
imminent attack. Consider the Caroline Affair of 1837: letters exchanged between 
American and British diplomats after the Affair suggested that there was a customary 
acceptance that anticipatory self-defense could be justified in select circumstances and 
that it was not inherently illegal. During the Caroline Affair, the US supplied soldiers, 
arms, and  
 “provisions using the steamboat SS Caroline to the rebel headquarters, as they were 
planning an invasion on Upper Canada. In response, the British seized the Caroline 
overnight, set it on fire, and then cast it adrift over Niagara Falls, killing two men in the 
process.”54 
 
In response, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to the British diplomat, and the  
US Secretary of State Daniel Webster and the British diplomat corresponded after the 
incident. In their letters, they concurred that anticipatory self-defense could be justified in 
situations where “the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
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choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”55 56 While it is an obscure case, the 
letters exchanged after the Caroline Affair show that there was a customary 
understanding among diplomats that states could act in self-defense when there is an 
imminent threat. In other words, a combatant need not wait until an attack has already 
been launched before it can respond in self-defense. This case was later cited by the US 
in its invasion of Iraq in 2003, which is discussed later in this section. 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 set up original frameworks for 
preventing widespread war. In tandem with the four treaties Geneva Conventions 
dictating just conduct during war, the Hague Conventions also established laws of war in 
international law. In four Conventions and three declarations, the Hague Conventions 
noted what kinds of conduct during war would be unacceptable; for example, Hague IV 
prohibited the use of poisonous gases.57 The first Convention of 1899 also created a 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to settle disputes between states.58 59 The conferences in 
1907 largely affirmed the protocols established eight years prior, but the third convention 
of 1907 stated permissible conduct “relative to the opening of hostilities.” 
The Convention stated that “hostilities between [states] must not commence without 
previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an 
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ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.”60 Many of these conventions were 
ignored during World War I; for instance, Germany’s invasion of Belgium was without 
warning as mandated in Hague III of 1907, and poisonous gas was used during World 
War I.61 Nevertheless, the frameworks set up in these conventions were later adapted into 
later conventions concerning just conduct during war, and the right to wage a war, or jus 
ad bellum.  
“The states of Europe and Latin America had already agreed, at key international 
conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, that the methods by which wars were 
conducted should also be limited, leading to the development of the modern law of 
war.”62 
 
6. b. Institutional Definitions Between World War I and World War II 
Pursuing different avenues to outlaw aggression culminated in the Treaty of 
Versailles of 1919, which officially terminated World War I. What was known as the 
“war to end all wars” had been catastrophic for Europe, leaving more than 17 million 
dead and another astounding 20 million wounded; more than 6 million of these deaths 
were civilians, and over 50% of Europe’s men dead or gravely wounded.63 Article 231 of 
the Treaty of Versailles did not specifically spell out terms like “crimes of aggression,” 
but it did include a “guilt clause,” where Germany was labeled the principal aggressor. In 
a measure that ultimately foreshadowed the Nuremberg Principles after WWII, UK Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George advocated prosecuting Kaiser Wilhelm as a war criminal—
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in other words, to hold him individually culpable for his conduct during war. However, 
US President Woodrow Wilson objected, claiming it was unclear who had jurisdiction. 64 
The Allied powers eventually agreed to issue an international arrest warrant for him, 
charging him with a “supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties”—essentially a euphemism for what the international legal community would 
eventually call “aggression.” 65 “These changes had so little basis in international law that 
the Dutch, who had custody of the Kaiser, refused to turn him over, and he died in the 
Netherlands in 1941, untried.” 66  Despite the jurisdictional ambiguity raised in this case, 
the concept of individual culpability for state leaders—especially for when these leaders 
were in power—became a central part of international legal dialogue. 67 
 The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) was another international effort to set a series of 
standards criminalizing the act of invading another state. 68 Named for the US Secretary 
of State Frank B. Kellogg and French Minister for Foreign Affairs Aristide Briand, 
signees of this Treaty (the US, Germany, and France) vowed to settle disputes 
peacefully.69 Various other nations in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East also 
became party to it.  
 The Pact was a precursor to the World Disarmament Conference, organized by 
the League of Nations, in 1932. The objective of this conference, as its title suggests, was 
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to drastically eliminate the number of arms each nation had; ideally, this would limit the 
capacity to which states could launch armed attacks on one another. Germany, whose 
military had already been significantly reduced under the Treaty of Versailles, refused to 
sign the treaty unless other signees reduced their number of arms to Germany’s levels; in 
the event that this was not agreed to, Germany demanded that it be allowed to rebuild its 
army. France, “which feared the revival of German power, argued that security must 
precede disarmament and called for security guarantees and the establishment of an 
international police force before it would reduce its own forces.” 70 In the midst of this 
gridlock, talks were postponed until February 1933. Hitler assumed power on January 30, 
1933; days after, he ordered the withdrawal of German delegates both from the 
conference and from the League of Nations all together. 71 Finding ways to reduce 
incentive and prevent war—as the Disarmament Conference clearly failed to do—was 
revisited after WWII again, in the crafting of the UN. 
 
6. c. “Aggression” Defined at the UN 
 After World War II, the Nuremberg Principles, which were established along with 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and other jus in bello war crimes included “crimes 
against peace,” known as Principle VI and which was later accepted by the UN General 
Assembly as a means for explaining “aggression.” Principle VI defined “crimes against 
peace” as:  
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(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;  
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the acts mentioned under (i).72 
 
It is worth noting that the Nuremberg Principles were conceived to hold individuals 
accountable for their roles in aiding Hitler. These principles were later codified for states 
to follow as well, specifically in the 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314. 
Though “aggression” is never specifically defined in the UN Charter, its implications for 
states—the threat of, or actual, use of force—are both prohibited. While Resolution 3314 
was technically a recommendation and not binding for UN member-states, it is customary 
to follow these resolutions.  
The definition of “aggression,” or “crimes against peace,” were made binding in 
the Rome Statute (or the International Criminal Court [ICC] Statute) treaty in 1998, 
which entered into force in 2002.73 Importantly, the Court may only begin exercising 
jurisdiction one year after the thirtieth ratification, and after the Assembly of States 
Parties has approved the commencement of jurisdiction, which it can only do after  
The definition below is a separate 2010 amendment that did define the crime of 
aggression, which will come into force in 2017: 
“1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations.  
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2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a 
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of 
the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an 
act of aggression:  
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or 
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof;  
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;  
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State;  
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State;  
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond 
the termination of the agreement;  
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State;  
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as 
to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”74 
 
This definition expands upon and renders binding the otherwise non-binding UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3314 (1974) that recommended aggression be 
considered a crime.75 However, the Court will not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression until “at least 30 States Parties have ratified or accepted the 
amendments [concerning the crime of aggression]; and a decision is taken by two-thirds 
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of States Parties to activate the jurisdiction at any time after 1 January 2017.”76  It is also 
important to note that states cannot be tried at the ICC; this Court is reserved solely for 
cases concerning the culpability of individuals. 
 
6. d. “Aggression” Adjudicated: 
  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) case, Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, was the first major judicial decision that solidified the working definition from 
Resolution 3314.77 While the case itself was complex, it first and foremost questioned the 
legality of one state clandestinely intervening in another’s domestic affairs.   
 This case built upon the UNGA Resolution 3314 (1974) definition of aggression 
was Nicaragua v. United States, which went to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
At the ICJ, Nicaragua asserted that the US had been supporting covert paramilitary 
operations for supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the socialist Sandinista 
National Liberation Front administration (FSLN). 78 Originally, the US declared that its 
support for the Contras, which it admitted was taking place, was self-defense: “the 
Reagan team equated the emergence of radical nationalism in Central America with 
Soviet-Cuban expansionism.” 79 The Sandinistas admittedly:  
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“looked to the Soviet Union and Cuba for assistance. In addition, the Sandinistas 
supported like-minded revolutionary movements in other countries. In particular, they 
provided safe haven and other assistance to Marxist rebels seeking to overthrow the 
government of El Salvador.”80 
 
Two years after the Sandinistas came into power after overthrowing the regime of 
Anastasio Somoza in 1979, the US found its pro-Marxist ideologies and tactics in the 
region threatening. At the beginning of the Reagan administration, the US began to 
support a group of rebels, called the contras, with financial, political, and military 
assistance.81 In 1984, Nicaragua appealed to the ICJ, intending to file suit under Article 
36(2) of the Court’s Statute. When the US saw that Nicaragua intended to sue, it asserted 
instead that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction. “When the Court ruled that it did have 
jurisdiction, the United States refused to participate further in the case, and on October 7, 
1985, terminated its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 36(2).”82  
 The ICJ continued to investigate Nicaragua’s claims because “the ICJ cannot 
render a default judgment.” 83 The US claimed that the FSLN’s attempts to undermine El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras were a threat to the region, and added that only 
monetary and military support from the US would protect it from a similar movement 
closer to the US. The ICJ ultimately found that the US had violated customary 
international law concerning non-intervention. 84 The Court specifically ruled that 
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military and paramilitary activities sponsored by the US “constitute[d] a clear breach of 
the principle of non-intervention.” 85 It added: 
“While the arming and training of the contras can certainly be said to involve the threat or 
use of force against Nicaragua, this is not necessarily so in respect of all the assistance 
given by the United States Government. In particular, the Court considers that the mere 
supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal 
affairs of Nicaragua[,]...does not in itself amount to a use of force.” 86 
 
Further, it found that the US could not claim that it was acting as a part of collective self-
defense, because there was no direct evidence that the Nicaraguan Civil War satisfied the 
conditions for collective self-defense as outlined in customary international law. While 
the Court affirmed that paramilitary support for the contras could be considered a threat 
or actual use of force, assistance to this group would still not satisfy the conditions for an 
“armed attack,” since it was indirect. It considered the response from Washington, 
however, “disproportional” to the attack allegedly made on El Salvador. To reiterate, 
while the US claimed supporting the contras in their war against the communist 
Sandinistas was self-defense, the ICJ rejected this claim.  
 The Stuxnet incident could be seen as similar to arming the Contras. The US 
arming Nicaraguan Contras was justified on highly preventive grounds. Stuxnet was also 
a highly preventive attack, albeit clandestine. Both could be seen as aggression, as the 
ICJ stated in this case. In this case, the ICJ stated that there needed to be a more direct 
link between imminent threat compromising US national security and what was 
happening in Nicaragua in order for the US to make an effective self-defense claim; since 
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it was unable to do that, the ICJ would likely find the Stuxnet incident to also be an act of 
aggression.  
The US invaded Iraq in 2003, claiming that there was sufficient evidence of 
weapons of mass destruction that would likely be used against them. Predicated on faulty 
evidence, the US asserted that its invasion of Iraq was “anticipatory self-defense.” It 
looked to the Caroline Affair as a precedent, and invaded, despite lacking approval from 
the UN. Intelligence for this operation proved faulty, and retroactively, we can consider 
this invasion a preventive attack and thus an act of aggression. Had there been higher 
certainty about the intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, an 
anticipatory self-defense claim would be more reasonable, and the invasion could then be 
justified under international law. If the evidence had been overwhelming, perhaps the US 
would have gained from the UN to strike first against Iraq.  
 Since there was inadequate evidence supporting the Americans’ intervention in 








7. Stuxnet As An Act Of Aggression 
 In this section, I apply the historical and legal connotations of “aggression” and 
“self-defense” to the Stuxnet incident. I argue that launching these worms was an act of 
aggression, not self-defense. 
 
7. a. Invoking Article 51: Self-Defense 
Particularly based on the ICJ’s Nicaragua ruling, it is clear that the US would be 
unable to claim collective self-defense with Israel for launching Stuxnet. There was no 
imminent attack prepared by the Iranians; thus, the US could not have claimed self-
defense. More broadly, it is also difficult to ascertain whether a cyber operation such as 
Stuxnet, with such a gradual impact, could be seen as clear anticipatory self-defense.  
Despite famously aggressive speech over decades by Iranian leadership towards 
the US and its allies, there was no specific, imminent threat that would warrant an attack 
in self-defense. The weapon that Iran was allegedly building was far from being a real 
threat, and “there is no rule in customary international law permitting another State to 
exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis of its own assessment of the 
situation.” 87 
  Self-defense can only be undertaken in the event of an armed attack. The term 
“armed attack” is typically applied in situations where there is a clear, kinetic result of an 
attack that has clearly endangered human lives.88 The Stuxnet operation did have a 
kinetic result of disrupting the production of centrifuges at Iran’s nuclear facility at 
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Natanz, so could be considered a US/Israeli attack on Iran. The lack of a prior “armed 
attack” or even imminent threat from Iran would not warrant the aggression from the US 
and Israel. Because there was neither prior attack nor an imminent one, the American and 
Israeli actions were likely disproportionate, and a breach of international law.   
 However, the Stuxnet operation more resembles industrial sabotage than an act of 
war. Could a cyber operation ever be considered analogous to a kinetic weapon causing 
physical damage? The answer depends upon the nature of the cyber operation. Some such 
operation could resemble the Stuxnet worms. Other operations might look more like a 
Wargames scenario, where a perpetrator might knowingly (or not) be on the brink of 
setting off nuclear weapons through cyberspace. As discussed earlier in this paper, most 
cyber operations are generally benign and do not endanger civilian lives. Clearer 
specification under international law of what constitutes an armed attack, aggression, 
aggression and how to determine and who judges the facts are needed to address threats 
like Stuxnet.  
The operation did have a kinetic result, but this physical damage is clearly not the 
same as an attack that endangers civilians. More centrally, however, we can ascertain that 
the Stuxnet operation was an act of aggression.  
 
7. b. Could The US Be Tried For Aggression? 
In the case of the Stuxnet operation, the US or Israel could not be tried per se, as 
neither has joined the ICC or ratified the amendment—but a chief operative who dictated 
the attack at a top chain of command could be. While Iran is a member of the UN, it has 





the UN Security Council [UNSC]. Given that the US has veto power on the Security 
Council, this is entirely unlikely.   
Although an American or Israeli citizen would not be able to be tried and 
convicted under this amendment, it is clear that, according to the definition of an “act of 
aggression,” the Stuxnet operation could be seen as, at least, an “act of aggression,” as 
defined in the 1974 General Assembly Resolution as well. It satisfies points (a), as this 
operation was clear, intentional industrial sabotage, violating Iran’s state sovereignty 
under the UN Charter.  
 
7. c. A Preventive Attack Without The Rome Statute 
 
 Since neither the US nor Israel is party to this amendment, operatives for either 
country technically could not be tried. The following scenario presumes that they were—
and shows that even in that instance, neither the US nor Israel officials could make a self-
defense claim under the UN Charter. 89 
 Theoretically, these nations could say—as they have—that Iran constitutes a 
danger to the national security of both states. Further, they could assert that they had no 
choice but to do everything possible—however discretely—to prevent such an attack 
from occurring. In any place, despite alarming statements from its political leadership, 
Iran did not pose an imminent threat to the US or Israel when the Stuxnet worms were 
launched. Even if the US and Israel were right that Iran posed a threat to the national 
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security of both states, without the presence of an imminent attack from Iran, this would 
still not warrant a military response—and it certainly could not be called self-defense.  
Responding to an armed attack in self-defense (or, state A initiating an attack first 
when there is an obvious threat with compelling evidence showing that State A will be 
attacked imminently) is permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter—in other words, a 
pre-emptive attack. The US and Israel might argue that the Stuxnet operation was an act 
out of collective self-defense. Given the kinetic result that occurred because of the 
Stuxnet operation, it could be considered an attack. However, the legitimacy of the self-
defense claim would depend upon Iran’s capabilities and intentions in the purported 
development of a nuclear weapon. At the time of the Stuxnet operation, Iran had not 
produced as much as a nuclear explosive, let alone a weapon. Since Iran was so far from 
having a developed weapon and posing an imminent threat, the Stuxnet operation was 
accomplished as a preventive, and not a pre-emptive, measure. Pre-emptive measures are 
legal; preventive ones are not. An attack cannot be considered “aggression” if it 
effectively a pre-emptive measure in self-defense—and this is central to understanding 
why the Stuxnet operation was not legal. 
At what point does responding to aggression become self-defense? The table on 
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2 Weapons deployment (say, 




3 Weapons deployment (say, 
sending weapons to air 
bases on missile sites) 
Preventive attack: 
Aggression 
4 Military mobilization 
(rising hostility, 
declarations of intent, 
offensive mobilization and 
development) 
If there is high certainty: 
Pre-emptive attack:  
Self-defense 
 
If there is low certainty: 
Preventive attack: 
Aggression.  
5 Attack (aggression) Clear self-defense 
 
 To best understand the difference between pre-emptive and preventive attacks, the 
question of “imminence” must be considered. A simple example of an imminent attack 





specific amount of time (like days, for instance) is defined as “imminent” in the charter or 
elsewhere. However, the purpose of using the phrase, however ambiguous, is to help 
states determine if there is sufficient evidence to conclude that one state will attack 
another.  
When Stuxnet was launched, Iran was still clearly in the first stage of developing 
a weapon. This shows that the US and Israel made a preventive (and therefore, illegal) 
attack against Iran, before Iran had ample chance to prepare an imminent attack. Even 
with the legal question of pre-emptive v. preventive attacks aside, this could also be 
shown in the nature of the Stuxnet operation, and the fact that it had a gradual impact on 
the construction of these centrifuges.  
 Using the framework for assessing aggression—and whether or not self-defense 
claims can be made under the UN Charter and Rome Statute—we can determine that the 







8. Why Iran Cannot Legally Retaliate For Stuxnet 
 
 Could Iran legally retaliate for Stuxnet—and would such action be self defense? 
Again, Article 51 of the UN Charter comes into play: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”90 
 Article 51 mandates that if states respond to an attack in self-defense, their 
response must be proportional. But what does “proportionality” mean practically for 
cyber operations? This section investigates the limitations of “proportionality” in 
response to a cyber attack. In doing so, it also addresses language in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter like “use of force” and “armed attack” which are also vague in terms of cyber 
attacks. 
 
8. a. Proportionality 
 Proportionality “provides the basis for determining the validity of a measure taken 
by a State to derogate from the human rights of those humans within the State’s scope of 
authority.”91  The US Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual reduces proportionality 
to mathematics: “Proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian terms: civilian 
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lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage gained.”92 The 
European Court of Human Rights states that, concerning jus in bello: “The force used 
must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims.”93  
 While the US arguably committed an act of aggression against Iran, it is unclear 
whether Iran could legally respond in a proportional manner. It also raises the following 
question: What would a proportional response be in the event of a destructive cyber 
operation? For example, could a state’s response to a cyber operation only be via another 
cyber operation? 
Iran has a limited range of legal options by which to respond to American 
aggression. As a member of the UN, Iran would need to go to the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) and obtain a vote from the P5 members94 to make its actions justifiable under 
Article 51. The US would obviously veto such a measure. If Iran’s act is self-defense, it 
doesn’t have to go to the UNSC first. It can act while going to the UNSC. But since the 
attack was over (and not hugely destructive), would a response even be self-defense—
especially six years after the attack was realized?  
But this also raises an important question in addressing Article 51 in the future: 
when coping with cyber operations that take place over a long period of time—especially 
operations that happen clandestinely, as in Stuxnet—how can the UN seek to rectify acts 
of aggression between states that occur in cyberspace?  
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There are other additional constraints that limit Iran’s range of options. The Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action from Summer 2015 between the Iran, the P5+1 (1 
referring to Germany) and the European Union lifts sanctions on Iran in exchange for 
close monitoring of its nuclear program. Iran claims that it was expanding its nuclear 
program for peaceful purposes; the international community disagreed. Responding to a 
cyber operation that took place a number of years ago, before the introduction of certain 
sanctions from the UN and EU, seems out of sync with its current relationships with these 
countries.  
From the language of Article 51, it is unclear in the context of non-conventional 
weaponry (namely, via cyber operations) what an “armed attack” would actually 
constitute. Stuxnet was the first cyber operation launched that had a direct, physical 
result, directed at one member of the UN by another, but it lacked civilian casualties. Its 
effect was gradual and happened over the course of many years. Thus, it does not 
necessarily suffice to say that Iran was the victim of an “armed attack.” 
The question of what constitutes an armed attack is also problematic. Article 51 
and the rest of the UN Charter were signed into force in 1945, after two uses of atomic 
bombs on Japan by the US. “Armed attack” clearly refers to conventional weapons, and 
weapons of mass destruction, being used by state actors. But when applied to cyber 
attacks that do not wreak the same immediate havoc as a bomb, does Article 51 and 
“armed attack” even suffice to discuss cyber warfare? 
Another central question surfaces from Article 51: would a cyber attack be 
considered a real, tangible “threat” to international peace and security? Perhaps not in any 





impacts. But future attacks could lead to a chain of reactions that could lead to massive 
destruction. Ted Koppel gives a picture of an American doomsday in the opening of 
Lights Out, which I paraphrased in this paper’s Introduction. While an attack on the US 
power grid is certainly different than a clandestine attack on Iranian centrifuge 
production, this shows that Article 51 is insufficient to address responses to aggressive 
cyber operations between states.  
 It is worth noting that there is a difference between a response that is legal and a 
response that has an effect. There are four possibilities for types of responses:  
                     
         Legal?  
 YES NO 
YES Yes, Yes Yes, No 
NO No, Yes No, No 
Effective?  
 
This table shows that legal responses are not effective in all scenarios. However, all of 
these scenarios would be difficult to gauge depending on if cyber attacks without an 
immediate physical impact would be considered having a truly catastrophic effect.  
 If Iran were to respond in self-defense shortly after the attack was realized, 
determining what that response would look like, based on Article 51 and regarding 
proportionality, is very difficult to determine. Unless Iran were to respond with an 
equally destructive cyber attack, it is unlikely that a kinetic response would be 
satisfactory for a proportional effect.   





Another concept that is crucial to understanding Stuxnet is the implication of the 
use of force. The Tallinn Manual notes that: “A cyber operation constitutes a use of force 
when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a 
use of force.”95 However, it adds that the UN Charter offers no specific criteria to 
determine what exactly constitutes a “use of force,” which makes ascertaining whether a 
cyber operation could be considered such ambiguous—unless it amounts to a military 
result. This was controversial for the drafters of the UN Charter: 
“The question was whether ‘force’ included ‘all forms of pressure, including those of a 
political or economic character, which have the effect of threatening the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State’ was answered in the negative. 
Accordingly, whatever ‘force’ may be, it is not mere economic or political coercion. 
Cyber operations that involve, or are otherwise analogous to, these coercive activities are 
definitely not prohibited uses of force.”96 
 
The use of force can be seen as analogous to methods of coercion; beyond the pursuit of 
political or economic means, the use of force in cyber operations would then refer to 
activities with a military result.  
The authors of the Tallinn Manual writes that in order to determine what would 
constitute a “use of force” in cyber operations, several factors must be considered to 
determine the degree of attempted coercion. These include:  
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(a) “Severity. Consequences involving physical harm to individuals or property 
will in and of themselves qualify the act as a use of force. Those generating mere 
inconvenience or irritation will never do so.” 97 98 
 (b) Immediacy of the effects.99  
(c) Directness, which determines the chain of causation. This includes the impact 
of an explosion, i.e. armed force that “directly harms people or objects,” versus an 
activity that occurs as a result of economic sanctions. 
(d) Invasiveness, “As a rule, the more secure a targeted cyber system, the greater 
the concern as to its penetration.”100 In other words, attacking high-profile  targets 
raises the stakes of the attack, and makes it more likely to be considered a misuse 
of force. 
(e) Measurability of effects: “the more quantifiable and identifiable a set of 
consequences, the easier it will be for a State to assess the situation when 
determining whether the cyber operation in question has reached the level of a use 
of force.”101 
(f) Military character: Or, determining if there is a viable connection between the 
cyber operation in question and a state’s military apparatus.  
(g) State involvement: This is along the general continuum of whether an invasive 
operation in question was conducted by a state.  
(h) Presumptive legality: “Acts that are not forbidden are permitted; absent an 
express treaty or accepted customary law prohibition, an act is presumptively 
legal.”102 
 
This is a substantial list of criterions to consider a “use of force” in a cyber attack—but 
even this criteria clearly applies to the assumptions of existing international law. There is 
still language about immediacy (b), how grave the effects are (e), involvement of the state 
(g), and so forth, all of which are relevant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. There is no 
single way to categorize a cyber attack. This is a problem for international lawmakers 
because it means each attack must be categorized on a case-by-case basis; apart from the 
US Department of Defense declaration that infiltrations are illegal, there is no norm to 
define attacks that will only happen more frequently, and likely become more serious as 
                                                
97 Schmitt, ibid, 48. 
98 This includes the scope, duration, and intensity of the response.  
99 As the Stuxnet worm affected the Natanz facility gradually and over a number of years, this long-term,  
continual effect could be seen as an attempted use of force.   
100 Schmitt, ibid, 49. 
101 Schmitt, ibid, 50. 





technology becomes more advanced. At what point would a cyber attack amount to a 
“use of force” under Article 51? Even the writers of the Tallinn Manual, whose goal was 
to determine the applicability of international law in cyber operations, were:  
 “divided as to whether the notion of armed attack, because of the term ‘armed’, 
necessarily involves the employment of ‘weapons’. The majority took the position 
that it did not and that instead the critical factor was whether the effects of a cyber 
operation, as distinct from the means used to achieve those effects, were 
analogous to those that would result from an action otherwise qualifying as a 
kinetic armed attack.” 
 
The term “armed attack” also implies that a physical attack has already taken place. In a 
cyber operation like Stuxnet, when would that be delineated? This was a continual attack 
that progressively inflicted damage on Natanz. Would this refer to when the worms were 
first launched, or after they inflicted a certain amount of damage? 
“However, as noted by the International Court of Justice, not every use of force 
rises to the level of an armed attack. (Nicaragua judgment, para. 191). The scale 
and effects required for an act to be characterized as an armed attack necessarily 
exceed those qualifying the act as a use of force. Only in the event that the use of 
force reaches the threshold of an armed attack is a State entitled to respond using 
force in self-defense.”103 
 
The many definitional problems of Article 51 make it challenging for Iran to retaliate in 
self-defense. Beyond the scope of Stuxnet, this also makes it difficult to determine what 
retaliation for different types of attacks would look like in the future. This shows that the 
standard rhetoric and procedures for states responding to typical warfare do not fit neatly 
with this growing field of malignant operations.  
 
                                                





9. Conclusion  
 
 This paper argues that the Stuxnet operation launched by the US on Iran’s nuclear 
facility would be considered an act of aggression under the Rome Statute.  
 After listing my research limitations, I established which sources were most 
relevant to my analysis. I defined terms central to my paper’s argument like “cyber,” 
which solidify the parameters of my argument. I showed how the vocabulary used by 
experts in international law is inconsistent with language directly related to cyber 
technologies.  
 I discussed the relevant branches of IR theory and sources of international law. I 
examined theories such as realism and liberalism and showed how these theorists debate 
the utility of international law. Next, I provided a technical explanation of the damage 
incurred by the Stuxnet worms, and discussed how it was discovered. I also described 
how the code was discovered as a generic source code that could have—and did—
affected any computer with the same technical parameters as the computers used at 
Natanz.  In the subsequent section, I gave a historical overview of the roots of aggression 
in international law. I tracked its sources, as well as terminology pertaining to pre-
emptive and preventive attacks. In applying this to Stuxnet in the following section, I 
determine that this operation would be seen as an act of aggression; a non-existent 
capability from Iran cannot constitute an imminent threat to US national security. In the 






Aggression is a jus ad bellum concept, as it concerns the right to wage a war. The 
Stuxnet incident took place over four years. Perhaps Iran could have responded shortly 
after the attack was realized; six years later, there is probably no legitimate military 
response. Chapter VII of the UN Charter states that the UNSC must find and authorize a 
use of force, or states can retaliate in self-defense. However, the chapter does not mention 
how much time a state has to respond in self-defense. Once the possibility to call an 
attack self-defense is precluded, cyber engagements render how we understand the laws 
of war incomplete. This shows that terms like “aggression,” “self-defense,” and 
“warfare” do not fit comfortably with cyber warfare. If international law is meant to 
mitigate the anarchy that exists in the international system, this new kind of warfare 
certainly warrants a closer look and Convention by lawmakers.  
 The questions raised in this paper that concern hazardous cyber operations are to 
be taken seriously by policy experts. Right now, cyber operations continue to exclusively 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, through the lens of conventional weapons and 
warfare. However, cyber conflicts are far from conventional weapons and warfare. The 
practical implications of cyber operations do not meet the standard definitions in 
international law. The Stuxnet incident could be seen as successful, at least in part before 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action from Summer 2015, which constrained the 
development of Iranian uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting sanctions. Such 
similar operations are likely to continue occurring as technology continues to advance—
and perhaps as individuals and organizations become more powerful in the international 





malignant behavior. So much can be done via cyberspace, so it is crucial that the 
international community take action to have some set of restraints.  
Some might consider this futile; as technology continues to develop, the 
international community will need to constantly evaluate its own law. Furthermore, one 
could say that this might preclude customary practices from accumulating and becoming 
international law. That said, having some regulation in place is a more viable alternative 
than having no basis for constraints at all, or no working definition about what constitutes 
an attack in the event of particularly malignant cyber operations. It is true that the scale of 
a cyber operation may determine whether or not it is congruous with an act of war in 
traditional definitions. Therefore, having some general criteria to clarify different types of 
legal responses under the Charter would set an important precedent as cyber conflicts 
happen even more frequently. 
International lawmakers must take the Stuxnet operation as a warning. Many 
scholars argue that Stuxnet introduced a new type of warfare into our international 
arsenal. Without a scale or clearer guidelines for each specific kind of cyber operation, 
per the degree to each type of cyber operation endangers civilians, the more challenging 











Legal Sources: Charters and Statutes 
 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (82 U.N.T.S. 279 [1945]).  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp  
 




Charter of the United Nations (1945).  
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf  
Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I). July 29,  
1899. Available through The Avalon Project: Yale Law School. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague01.asp  
“Case Concerning the Military and Paramlitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua  
(Nicaragua v. United States of America).” International Court of Justice, 1986. 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5  
 
Schmitt, Michael N. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber  
Warfare: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence. New York, New York: 




Baldwin, Simeon E. "The Proposed Trial of the Former Kaiser." The Yale Law School  




Buchan, Russell. "Explaining Liberal Aggression: The International Community and  
Threat Perception." International Community Law Review 12 (2010): 413-36. 
EBESCO.  
 
Eriksson, Johnan and Giampiero Giacomello. “The Information Revolution, Secutity, and  
International Relations: (IR) Relevant Theory?” International Political Science 
Review 3 (2006): 221-44. Accessed July 30, 2015. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445053. 
 






Grossman, Levi. “Cyberattack Attribution Matters Under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”  
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 36, no. 3 (2011): 1151-180. 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti. “Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for a  
Critical View.” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. Vol. 27, 
Issue 2. (2013): 215-240.  
 
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International  
Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49-80.  
 
Langner, Ralph. “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators  
Tried to Achieve.” The Langner Group, 2013. 
 
Newton, Michael and Larry May. “Proportionality in International Law.” From  
Proportionality in Human Rights Law and Morality. Oxford University Press 
(2014): 1-27. 
 
Paulus, Andreas. “Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression.” The European Journal  
of International Law ,Vol. 20 no. 4 (2010). 1117-1128. EBESCO.  
 
Ratner, Steven R. “Aggression.” Crimes of War. http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-
guide/aggression/ 
 
Rid, Thomas, and Ben Buchanan. “Attributing Cyber Attacks.” Journal of Strategic  
Studies 38, no. 1-2 (2014): 4-37. Accessed October 27, 2015. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.977382. 
 
Rosenberg, Tina. 1995. “Tipping the Scales of Justice”. World Policy Journal 12 (3).  
[Sage Publications, Inc., Duke University Press]: 55–64. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209427. 
 
Sayapin, Sergey. The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law. TMC Asser  
Press, the Hague, The Netherlands. 2014. 
 
Simma, Bruno. “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects.” European  
Journal of International Law, 1999. http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/567.pdf  
 
Solis, Gary D. The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
 





Iran’s Nuclear Development Facilities." Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, March 14, 2009, 3-114. Accessed March 9, 2016. 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf.  
 
Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness. “Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber  
Conflict in the International System.” Oxford University Press Scholarship 
Online, 2015. Accessed August 30, 2015. 
 
Vantanparast, Roxana. "International Law Versus The Preemptive Use of Force: Racing  
to Confront the Specter of a Nuclear Iran." UC Hastings College of the Law 





Ashford, Warwick. "Problems in Attributing Cyber Attacks Could Foil US Sanctions  
against Hackers." Computer Weekly, 2015.  
 
Borger, Julian. "Iran Nuclear Deal: World Powers Reach Historic Agreement to Lift  




Fathi, Nazila. "Ahmadinejad Sees Nuclear Energy in Iran by 2009." The New York  




Good, Chris. “How Many Nuclear Weapons Does the US Have? Don’t Ask A  




Mazzetti, Mark. "U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003." The New  




Nakashima, Ellen, and Joby Warrick. "Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts,  













Pruszewicz, Marek. "How Deadly Was the Poison Gas of WW1? - BBC News." BBC  
News. January 30, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31042472.  
 
Sanger, David E. "Limiting Security Breaches May Be Impossible Task for U.S. and  




Stark, Holger. "Mossad's Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber War."  
Der Spiegel. August 8, 2011. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mossad-s-
miracle-weapon-stuxnet-virus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a-778912.html.  
 
Traynor, Ian. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.” The  
Guardian, May 16, 2007. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia  
 
Zetter, Kim. "How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware  






Brenner, Joel. Glass Houses: Privacy, Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity in a Transparent  
World. Penguin, 2013.  
 
Brenner, Susan W. Cyberthreats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2009.  
 
Cole, Darrell. Just War and the Ethics of Espionage. Routledge, 2015.  
 
Dunoff, Jeffrey L., Steven D. Ratner, and David Wippman. International Law: Norms,  
Actors, Process: A Problem-Oriented Approach. New York, NY: Aspen, 2010. 
 
Koppel, Ted. Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath.  
Crown, 2015.  
 
Ruys, Tom. “Armed Attack” and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary  
Law and Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
 






Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. 4th ed. New York, 1948.  
 
Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs  
to Know. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub.  
1979.  
 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations.  






Langner, Ralph. TED Talk. 2013.  
http://www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyber
weapon/transcript?language=en#t-175983  
 
 
 
 
 
 
